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Abstract. Lightweight bytecode verification uses stack maps to anno-
tate Java bytecode programs with type information in order to reduce the
verification to type checking. This paper describes an improved bytecode
analyser together with algorithms for optimizing the stack maps gener-
ated. The analyser is simplified in its treatment of base values (keeping
only the necessary information to ensure memory safety) and enriched
in its representation of interface types, using the Dedekind-MacNeille
completion technique. The computed interface information allows to re-
move the dynamic checks at interface method invocations. We prove
the memory safety property guaranteed by the bytecode verifier using
an operational semantics whose distinguishing feature is the use of un-
tagged 32-bit values. For bytecode typable without sets of types we show
how to prune the fix-point to obtain a stack map that can be checked
without computing with sets of interfaces i.e., lightweight verification is
not made more complex or costly. Experiments on three substantial test
suites show that stack maps can be computed and correctly pruned by
an optimized (but incomplete) pruning algorithm.
1 Introduction
The Java bytecode verifier, which is part of the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) [13],
is a central component of Java security. At load time, the verifier checks that the
bytecode conforms to the JVM typing policy. Together with additional dynamic
checks this enables the virtual machine to run safely untrusted bytecodes such
as web applets or mobile phone midlets. While the standard bytecode verifier
performs a dataflow analysis on the bytecode the lightweight bytecode verifier [4]
only checks the analysis result (which is called a stack map) that is shipped with
the bytecode. It was originally designed for resource-constrained devices but the
mainstream Java 2 Standard Edition (J2SE) is now moving towards lightweight
bytecode verification, with slightly enhanced stack maps (see JSR 202 [9]).
A particular issue for the type inference performed in bytecode verification
is the possibility for a class to implement several interfaces. The problem arises
as soon as the language has multiple inheritance (only for interfaces, in the case
of Java). This implies that the type hierarchy is not a lattice and prevents the
computation of a unique most precise type for some variables, unless using sets
of types. For simplicity, the choice made in the original verifiers (both standard
void foo(boolean b) {
if (b) {
(1) i:=new A();
} else {
(2) i:=new B();
(3) }
(4) i.m1();
(5) i.m2();
}
(a) Main method
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Fig. 1: A Java bytecode program and its type hierarchy
and lightweight) was to ignore interfaces in bytecode verification and to make
the necessary checks dynamically. This choice has been maintained in JSR 202.
We propose to extend the bytecode analysis to check interfaces statically,
using conjunctions of types, and then to prune the result to get a stak map
without conjunctions that can be fed to an almost unmodified checker. This does
not work for every bytecode, but it applies to bytecode obtained by compilation
of Java programs. As a result, the dynamic checks on interface methods may be
safely removed for free. We describe the case of (idealised) Java bytecode, but
the solution would apply to a more general use of multiple inheritance.
In this paper, the term analysis refers to the typing process that produces
stack maps, checking is the validation of those stack maps on the consumer’s
side, and verification encompasses analysing, possibly pruning, and checking.
Motivating example Figure 1 provides a small example which illustrates the
existing verification and its extension to conjunctive types. Figure 1a repre-
sents a bytecode program written in pseudo Java, without type information. We
suppose a type hierarchy with three classes A, B and C and four interfaces Ii
(i ∈ [1, . . . , 4]) where C implements and I3 extends I1 and I2, and A and B
implements I3 and I4. Each interface Ii declares a method mi. Figure 1b shows
the completion of the type hierarchy that is used by our enhanced analyser,
which adds the elements I1 ∧ I2 and I3 ∧ I4 to the type hierarchy.
The standard bytecode verifier ignores interfaces. Thus, in method foo, the
variable i at program point 3 is given as type the first common super-class of A
and B, i.e., Object. Note also that the call to each method mi is in fact a call
to the method of interface Ii, where it is declared. When analysing those calls,
the bytecode verifier only checks statically that the variable i contains an object
type. At run-time, the JVM dynamically checks whether the object referenced
by i implements I1 and I2, before doing a lookup with respect to the dynamic
type of i. If it is not the case, a run-time exception is thrown.
Our extended analizer will type the example program using conjunctions
of types, and in particular, the variable i at program point 3 will have type
I3 ∧ I4, which is propagated at program points 4 and 5. As this is a sub-type of
both I1 and I2, this ensures that the two method calls are safe. However, for the
purpose of lightweight bytecode verification, it is desirable to avoid annotating
the variables with conjunctions. The backtracking pruning algorithm proposed
in Section 4 detects that in the above conjunction, only I3 is needed to type
the subsequent method invocations, hence it removes I4. In the resulting stack
map, the variable i has therefore the type I3 at program points 3, 4 and 5.
The example also shows that opting for a backward program analysis does
not simplify the problem. An analyser which starts from the invocation sites
and propagates these “uses” of a variable to the point of definition would still
require the use of conjunctions and lead to a back-tracking algorithm. With
such a technique, the variable i at program point 5 would get the type I2. The
problem arises when typing i at program point 4: it must be the intersection of
I1 and I2, which requires either to introduce the conjunction I1 ∧ I2, or to
choose one of the types C and I3. The right choice can only be made knowing
the creation sites 1 and 2, hence the need for a backtraking algorithm.
Organisation of the paper The formal development of these ideas is done
in Sections 2–4. We define the intraprocedural part of a small-step operational
semantics with big-step calls for a subset of the Java bytecode (Section 2), with
a low-level treatment of values that allows for a convincing definition of the
memory safety property (which is the base for all other security properties). The
analysis is presented in Section 3 in terms of an abstract interpretation [5]. We
define the notions of stack maps and lightweight verification for a method, and
state the main soundness theorem of the stack maps produced by the analysis.
Section 4 describes the pruning algorithms that remove conjunctive types from
those stack maps. We give an efficient algorithm that works in all but some
well-identified, pathological cases, that do not seem to occur in average Java
programs. We report on some experiments on verifying Soot, Eclipse and a suite
of Java MIDP applets for mobile phones with a prototype implementation in
Section 5. Related work is discussed in Section 6 and Section 7 concludes.
Notations Sets have long italic names, other constants and constants functions
are in roman, with the exception of bytecode instructions for which we use
sans serif. Meta-variables have short lowercase italic names, except that we write
C, I, F ♯ for classes, interfaces and abstract transfer functions, respectively.
For sets a and b, we write a ⇀ b for the set of partial functions from a to b. If
f is a partial function, dom(f) is the domain of f , and any boolean expression e
containing a sub-expression f(e′) implicitely means: e′ ∈ dom(f) ∧ e. We note
|x| for the cardinal of the set x, or the cardinal of its domain if x is a function. If
f is a function (or a partial function), we note f [x← v] the function that maps
x to v and any y 6= x to f(y).
Cartesian product takes precedence over other set operations: × ≺ ∪,→,⇀.
2 Intraprocedural semantics and memory safety
In this section we define formally our bytecode language and its semantics, and
state the memory safety property that we ensure. We define the semantics (and
safety) of one single method, parameterised by the semantics of the (direct)
method calls it may involve. The interprocedural part of the semantics (which
is essentially defined as a least fix-point of the intraprocedural semantics) and
the proof that the safety property can be lifted to whole programs are omitted
for space reasons. Details can be found in section 4 of a companion technical
report [2].
2.1 The Java bytecode language
We present a minimal subset of the language, abstracting away irrelevant features
(such as the operand stack) while keeping the main aspects (objects, interface
methods) that are relevant to typing. The subset is sufficiently representative
for the results to extend to the whole Java bytecode. We list some features
that are absent from our language. The local operand stack is a feature of the
bytecode that has no impact on the abstract domain used for the verification.
For this reason, we replace actual bytecode instructions by three-address style
instructions that directly operate on local variables. Constant fields and static
or interface members, exceptions, void methods, basic types others than int,
sub-routines, threads, class and objects initialisation, access control (visibility),
as well as explicit type checks (the checkcast instruction) are not considered. We
discuss their impact on this study in Section 5.1. Also, for conciseness we use
less specialised instructions than the real JVM (for example, we merge iaload
and aaload, ireturn and areturn).
Let ident be the set of fully qualified Java identifiers. We assume a set class ⊂
ident of class names with a distinguished element Object, and a disjoint set
interface ⊂ ident of interface names. We define the set of types recursively as:
type ::= int | C | I | t []
where C ∈ class, I ∈ interface, and t ∈ type.
The class hierarchy is modeled by the following three functions:
super : class \ {Object} → class
implements : class → P(interface)
extends : interface → P(interface)
The function super must be the ancestor function of a tree with root Object:
∀C ∈ class ∃i ≥ 0 superi(C) = Object.
A method signature is made of an object type, an identifier and a list of
parameter types. We assume a subset msig of such signatures which represents
the methods that are declared in the program being verified:
msig ⊂ {t .m(t1, . . . , tn) | t ∈ type \ {int},m ∈ ident , ti ∈ type}
Note that we have a virtual method signature if t is a class or an array type, and
an interface method signature otherwise. We let arity(t .m(t1, . . . , tn)) = n. Each
method signature has a return type given by the function result : msig → type.
A field signature is made of a class name, an identifier and a type. We assume
a subset fsig of such signatures:
fsig ⊂ {C.f : t | C ∈ class, f ∈ ident , t ∈ type}
Note that C.f : t represents a field declared in class C, and consequently, the
set of fields that are relevant for a given class of objects must be looked for in
its super-classes too (see the function fields in Section 2.2).
As stated in the introduction, we only consider the verification of one “cur-
rent” method. We write var for the set of local variables of the method to
verify and arg ⊆ var for its set of formal parameters, whose types are de-
scribed by the function targ : arg → type. The return type of the current
method is denoted by tret ∈ type. Program points are represented by the in-
terval ppoint = [0, |ppoint | − 1]. Expressions and instructions are defined as
follows. Here, C ranges over classes, t over types, ms over method signatures, fs
over field signatures, x, y, z, xi over local variables, and p over program points.
expr ::= n n ∈ [−231, 231 − 1]
| null | y + z | new C | y.fs | new t [y] | y[z]
| y.ms(x1, . . . , xarity(ms))
instr ::= x := e e ∈ expr
| x.fs := y | x[y] := z | goto p | if x < y p | return x
The method code is represented by the function code : ppoint → instr mapping
program points to instructions. The last instruction code(|ppoint | − 1) must be
either goto p for some p or return x for some x.
These last definitions enforce some well-formedness constraints on the code:
the execution remains within the bounds of the code and cannot fall through
the end, only valid local variables are referred to, and methods are always called
with the right number of arguments. These properties are normally checked by
the bytecode verifier prior to the type verifications.
2.2 Semantics
The operational semantics is defined as a small-step transition relation between
program states (except for method calls which are big-step). A distinguishing
feature of our semantic model is that we use a single data type of 32-bit values
both for signed integer values and memory locations (note that objects and
arrays are still annotated with their dynamic type in the heap, as in actual JVM
implementations). This differs from most other formalisations where a disjoint
set of locations is used (or equivalently, values are tagged with their type), this
choice being only informally justified, as e.g. by Pusch [14]:
“[. . . ] the type information is not used to determine the operational
semantics of (correct) JVM code.”
Barthe, Dufay, Jakubiec and de Sousa [1] formalized this intuition by considering
the actual virtual machine (which is called offensive) as an abstraction of the
tagged (defensive) machine, and proving that the former correctly abstracts the
latter, whenever the latter does not raise a type error (which is true for verifiable
bytecode). Working directly with an untagged semantics immediately frees us
from the risk of making unwanted implicit typing assumptions.
A precise model of the memory layout of objects and arrays is however not
necessary. It is enough to use functions, state explicitly their domain and not
use them outside of it; any concrete representation, for example that maps these
domains to sets of offsets, will conform to this model, if the allocator keeps track
of the range of objects and does not make them overlap.
Errors We make an important distinction between two kinds of errors:
– Runtime errors that are checked for dynamically and cause the JVM to raise
an exception, such as accessing an array out of bounds or putting an element
of the wrong type in it, are represented by the absence of transition.
– Actual type errors (called linking errors in the JVM specification) that vi-
olate the assumptions that a virtual machine implementation is allowed to
make about the code (see [13]), such as dereferencing an integer, or accessing
a non-existing field of an object, are represented by a transition to the spe-
cial state error. This second kind of errors must be correctly handled by the
bytecode verification, as the behavior of the virtual machine is unspecified
for those cases, and in practice this can result in a crash (in the optimistic
case) or the by-passing of access controls.
In the current JVM, the invokeinterface instruction raises the exception
IncompatibleClassChangeError if the receiver of the method does not
implement the interface. Because our enhanced bytecode verifier will also type-
check interfaces, we shift this exception from the class of runtime errors to the
class of type errors. In our semantics, interface calls are dealt with like virtual
calls and it is a type error if the receiver of an interface call does not implement
the desired interface. Remark that the runtime errors raised in the explicit cast
instruction (which we don’t consider) are not removed by this technique.
Objects, arrays and states We write word for the set of 32-bit values. Values
are used to represent signed integers as well as memory locations. We let fields :
class → P(fsig) be the function that returns the set of (transitively inherited)
fields of a class:
fields(C) = {C.f : t ∈ fsig} ∪
{
fields(super(C)) if C 6= Object
∅ otherwise
An object is a pair 〈C, o〉 where C ∈ class and o : fields(C) → word gives
the value of the relevant fields. We write object for the set of objects. We let
array be the set of arrays, annotated with their element type (which can be
an array type). We define heap as the sets of partial mappings from non-zero
values to objects and arrays. The memory allocator is represented by a partial
function alloc : heap ⇀ word \ {0} that maps a heap h to a value that is
not defined in h (the absence of value represent the failure of the allocation)4:
∀h ∈ heap alloc(h) = v =⇒ v 6∈ dom(h). A program state s = 〈h, l , p〉 consists
of a heap, a (total) mapping from variables to values, and a program point.
object = {〈C, o〉 | C ∈ class, o : fields(C)→ word}
array = {〈t , a〉 | t ∈ type, a : [0, n− 1]→ word , n ≥ 0}
heap = word \ {0}⇀ (object ∪ array)
state = heap × (var → word)× ppoint
Dynamic typing We first recall the standard sub-typing order  ⊆ type×type
induced by the functions super, implements and extends. Note that, in J2SE,
every array type is a sub-type of the two interfaces Cloneable and Serializable.
t  t
t  t ′ t ′  t ′′
t  t ′′
t  t ′
t []  t ′[]
C  super(C)
I ∈ implements(C)
C  I
I ′ ∈ extends(I)
I  I ′
I  Object t []  Cloneable t []  Serializable
The key properties that are actually used in the following are i) that  is a
partial order ii) the existence of the maximum element (which is called Object
in this case) iii) the covariant ordering of array types (third rule in the first line)
and of course the link with the functions super, implements and extends, for the
language that we consider.
The dynamic typing relation h ⊢ v : t between heaps, 32-bit values and types
is defined as follows:
h ⊢ v : int h ⊢ 0 : t
h(v) = 〈C, o〉 ∈ object C  t
h ⊢ v : t
h(v) = 〈t , a〉 ∈ array t []  t ′
h ⊢ v : t ′
It is worth noting that dynamic types can be checked efficiently by at most a
heap access and a sub-typing check. This is important as such an operation is
used by the concrete semantics of array assignment.
Method calls Let bigstep be the type of big-step semantics for methods.
bigstep = P


⋃
n≥0
((heap × word × wordn)× (heap × word ∪ {error}))


4 This is not completely accurate, as the allocation also depends on the needed size.
JnKh,l = n (32-bit signed encoding)
JnullKh,l = 0
Jy + zKh,l = l(y) + l(z)
Jy.fsKh,l =
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
o(fs) if h(l(y)) = 〈C, o〉 ∈ object ∧ fs ∈ fields(C)
⊥ if l(y) = 0
error if l(y) 6= 0 ∧ l(y) 6∈ dom(h)
∨ h(l(y)) 6∈ object
∨ h(l(y)) = 〈C, o〉 ∈ object ∧ fs 6∈ fields(C)
Jy[z]Kh,l =
8
<
:
a(l(z)) if h(l(y)) = 〈t , a〉 ∈ array ∧ 0 ≤ l(z) < |a|
⊥ if l(y) = 0 ∨ h(l(y)) = 〈t , a〉 ∈ array ∧ ¬ 0 ≤ l(z) < |a|
error if l(y) 6= 0 ∧ l(y) 6∈ dom(h) ∨ h(l(y)) 6∈ array
(a) Semantics JeKh,l ∈ word ∪{error,⊥} of a side-effect free expression e in context h, l
Fig. 2: Semantics of Java bytecode
Let bs ∈ bigstep and 〈〈h, this, args〉, r〉 ∈ bs. this represents the object on which
the method is to be invoked, and args represents the list of the arguments. The
result r is either the error constant or a pair 〈h′, v〉 ∈ heap × word where v is
the returned value and h′ is the heap obtained by running the method from the
initial heap h. The direct method calls that may arise during the execution of
the current method are represented by associating a big step transition relation
ms
−→ ∈ bigstep
to each method signature ms (note that the relation for one method signature
may correspond to several methods due to dynamic binding). As the relation is
supposed to represent every possible call without any assumption on the argu-
ments, is must be defined even for ill-typed ones, possibly with the result error.
Also, we make no hypothesis on the correctness of the invoked method yet, thus
the error state may be returned even for arguments of the right type. The ab-
sence of transition from a particular list of arguments represents non-termination
or a runtime exception.
Transition relation The semantics itself is given in Figure 2 by the transition
relation
→ ⊆ state × (state ∪ heap × word ∪ {error})
A couple of features in this semantics merit explanation: Writing to a field
(see Figure 2b) always succeeds (provided the field exists for the target object),
even if the value that is written is not of the right type. This is not a safety
violation in itself; only a future misuse of this bad value would be an error.
Writing to an array always triggers a dynamic check5 and the execution is stuck
if the value stored in the array is not a sub-type of the array’s own type, or
if the index is out of bounds. Remember that a run-time exception of virtual
5 This is unavoidable with the covariant arrays of the Java type system.
Jx := eK(h, l) =
8
>
<
>
:
h, l [x← JeKh,l ]
if JeKh,l 6∈ {⊥, error}
⊥ if JeKh,l = ⊥
error if JeKh,l = error
9
>
=
>
;
if e 6∈ {y.ms(· · · ),
new C,
new t [y]}
Jx := new CK(h, l) =
8
<
:
h[v ← 〈C, λfs ∈ fields(C).0〉], l [x← v]
if alloc(h) = v
⊥ if h 6∈ dom(alloc)
Jx := new t [y]K(h, l) =
8
<
:
h[v ← 〈t , λi ∈ [0, l(y)− 1].0〉], l [x← v]
if l(y) ≥ 0 ∧ alloc(h) = v
⊥ if l(y) < 0 ∨ h 6∈ dom(alloc)
Jx.fs := yK(h, l) =
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
h[l(x)← 〈C, o[fs ← l(y)]〉], l
if h(l(x)) = 〈C, o〉 ∈ object ∧ fs ∈ fields(C)
⊥ if l(x) = 0
error if l(x) 6= 0 ∧ l(x) 6∈ dom(h)
∨ h(l(x)) 6∈ object
∨ h(l(x)) = 〈C, o〉 ∈ object ∧ fs 6∈ fields(C)
Jx[y] := zK(h, l) =
8
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
:
h[l(x)← 〈t , a[l(y)← l(z)]〉], l
if h(l(x)) = 〈t , a〉 ∈ array
∧ h ⊢ l(z) : t ∧ 0 ≤ l(y) < |a|
⊥ if l(x) = 0
∨ l(x) = 〈t , a〉 ∈ array
∧ ¬ (h ⊢ l(z) : t ∧ 0 ≤ l(y) < |a|)
error if l(x) 6= 0 ∧ l(x) 6∈ dom(h) ∨ h(l(x)) 6∈ array
(b) Semantics JiK : heap × (var → word) → (heap × (var → word) ∪ {error,⊥}) of a
non-branching intraprocedural instruction i
i 6∈ {goto p, if · · · , return x, x := y.ms(· · · )} JiK(h, l) 6= ⊥
h, l
i
−→ JiK(h, l) h, l
return x
−→ h, l(x)
h, l(y), l(x1), . . . , l(xn)
ms
−→ h ′, v
h, l
x:=y.ms(x1,...,xn)
−→ h ′, l [x← v]
h, l(y), l(x1), . . . , l(xn)
ms
−→ error
h, l
x:=y.ms(x1,...,xn)
−→ error
(c) Semantics
i
−→ ⊆ (heap× (var → word))× (heap× (var → word)∪ heap×word ∪
{error}) of a non-branching instruction i
code(p) 6∈ {goto p′, if · · · } h, l
code(p)
−→ r r ∈ heap × word ∪ {error}
〈h, l , p〉 → r
code(p) 6∈ {goto p′, if · · · } h, l
code(p)
−→ h ′, l ′
〈h, l , p〉 → 〈h ′, l ′, p + 1〉
code(p) = goto p′
〈h, l , p〉 → 〈h, l , p′〉
code(p) = if x < y p′ l(x) < l(y)
〈h, l , p〉 → 〈h, l , p′〉
code(p) = if x < y p′ l(x) ≥ l(y)
〈h, l , p〉 → 〈h, l , p + 1〉
(d) Small step transition relation → ⊆ state × (state ∪ heap × word ∪ {error})
Fig. 2: Semantics of Java bytecode (continued)
machine is modelled in our setting by the execution being stuck. Finally, in
Figure 2c, it is important to remember that a method call can occur with ill-
typed arguments, and that the invoked method itself can be ill-typed, hence the
rule for propagating the error state.
2.3 Memory safety
We give a modular definition of memory safety that is stronger than what is
actually needed for a complete program: it includes the preservation of the well-
typedness of the heap, and the fact that the heap is only extended, which is
needed to ensure a global safety. This property requires some prior definitions
to express those accurate invariants about the heap.
Well typed heaps The following relation expresses that a heap is consistent.
∀v ∈ word \ {0}











v 6∈ dom(h)
∨ h(v) = 〈C, o〉 ∈ object
∧ ∀C ′.f : t ∈ fields(C) h ⊢ o(C ′.f : t) : t
∨ h(v) = 〈t , a〉 ∈ array
∧ ∀i ∈ [0, |a| − 1] h ⊢ a(i) : t
h ⊢ h
Ordering on heaps The relation ⋐ expresses the preservation of existing ob-
jects between two heaps.
∀v ∈ word \ {0}



v 6∈ dom(h)
∨ h(v) = 〈C, o〉 ∈ object ∧ h ′(v) = 〈C, o′〉 ∈ object
∨ h(v) = 〈t , a〉 ∈ array ∧ h ′(v) = 〈t , a ′〉 ∈ array
h ⋐ h ′
Modular memory-safety Definition 1 introduces the general safety property
for the transition relation associated with a method. We need to give two variants
of it since we use slightly different formalisations for the transition relation of
the current method and the relations representing method calls. As errors are
immediately propagated in the semantics, it is sound to define the safety as the
unreachability of error in the outermost invocation.
Definition 1. The relation → ⊆ state× (state ∪ (heap×word)∪{error}) is safe
with respect to targ and tret if for all h, l such that h ⊢ h ∧ ∀x ∈ arg h ⊢
l(x) : targ(x) then 〈h, l , 0〉 6→
∗ error and 〈h, l , 0〉 →∗ h ′, v =⇒ h ⋐ h ′ ∧ h ′ ⊢
h ′ ∧ h ′ ⊢ v : tret.
Similarly, a transition relation
ms
−→ ∈ bigstep is safe with respect to the sig-
nature ms = t .m(t1, . . . , tn) if for all h, v, v1, . . . , vn such that h ⊢ h ∧ h ⊢ v :
t ∧ ∀i ≤ n h ⊢ vi : ti then h, v, v1, . . . , vn 6
ms
−→ error and h, v, v1, . . . , vn
ms
−→
h ′, v′ =⇒ h ⋐ h ′ ∧ h ′ ⊢ h ′ ∧ h ′ ⊢ v′ : result(ms).
Memory safety and security In this paper we focus on memory safety which
is just one aspect of the security of Java bytecode. Memory safety ensures that
the virtual machine will not crash when executing the program but the secure
execution of untrusted bytecode requires stronger properties. A common (infor-
mal) security requirement is that a program should not be able to forge a pointer
to a heap location that it is not supposed to have access to; this is not easy to de-
fine formally without instrumenting the semantics. With the semantics defined in
this section we can prove that a method whose return type is a reference type will
return a heap location that is either unnallocated in the initial heap or reachable
through the (reference) arguments with which the method was invoked. This is
ensured by the analysis of Section 3 without any modification: only the proofs
must be extended by strengthening the concretisation function for the abstract
domain. This is still too simplistic, as it does not distinguish between private
or public fields, nor does it account for the fact that an untrusted program can
be given controlled access to some (private) objects through the invocation of
trusted methods from the API. Nevertheless, even though the memory safety
defined here does not in itself imply any access restriction property, the analysis
by which we ensure memory safety represents a large part of what is needed to
ensure security, as shown by Leroy and Rouaix [12] who formalize such stronger
security properties and give sufficient conditions, in addition to well-typedness,
for an applet to be safe with respect to these properties.
3 Extended bytecode typing
In this section we present an extended abstract domain for bytecode verification
and prove it sound with respect to the semantics. The main difference with the
standard verifier is the use of interfaces in types, which make the runtime check in
the “invokeinterface” instruction unnecessary. Another difference is that integers
are abstracted by ⊤v. This simplifies the presentation and the stack maps.
3.1 Abstract domain
The abstract domain elements are called stack maps in the context of Java
bytecode verification, as they normally map program points to abstract operand
stacks. We keep this name even though the stack is absent in our setting. Our
abstract domain associates a type to each variable at each program point. This
type is either ⊤v (for non-reference values), null, or a conjunction of object (or
array) types.
value♯ ::= null | ⊤v
| t1 ∧ · · · ∧ tn n ≥ 1, ti ∈ type \ {int},
∀i, j ≤ n ti  tj =⇒ i = j
state♯ = var → value♯
map = ppoint → state♯
state♯
⊤s
⊥s
= state♯ ∪ {⊥s,⊤s}
The two special abstract states ⊥s and ⊤s indicate respectively an unreachable
program point and the possibility of the (concrete) error state being reachable.
We also define the abbreviation state♯
⊤s
⊥s
. Conjunctions are defined up to the
order, i.e., t ∧ t ′ = t ′ ∧ t .
A conjunction is to be interpreted as the set of objects that are a member of
every atomic type in it. Note that we only consider conjunctions of unordered
atomic types. This is necessary to be able to define an order on abstract values
and not just a pre-order, and also to make the concretisation (almost) injective
(as adding a super-type of another conjunct does not change the concretisation of
a conjunction). Another isomorphic solution is to consider upward-closed (with
respect to ) sets of atomic types. We choose the first representation which is
more compact and hence allows us to compute least upper bounds efficiently
(see below).
The following definition identifies a subset of stack maps in which we want
to choose a “certificate” to send with the current method.
Definition 2. A stack map m ∈ map is conjunction-free if all of its conjunc-
tions t1 ∧ · · · ∧ tn are reduced to one element ( i.e., n = 1).
Concretisation We define the concretisation functions γh : value
♯ → P(word),
h ∈ heap, γp : state
♯⊤s
⊥s
→ P(state ∪ {error}), p ∈ ppoint and γ : (value♯ ∪
{⊤s})→ P((heap × word) ∪ {error}) by
γh(⊤v) = word
γh(null) = {0}
γh(t1 ∧ · · · ∧ tn) = {v ∈ word | ∀i ≤ n h ⊢ v : ti}
γp(⊥s) = ∅
γp(⊤s) = state ∪ {error}
γp(l
♯) = {〈h, l , p〉 ∈ state | h ⊢ h ∧ ∀x ∈ var l(x) ∈ γh(l
♯(x))}
γ(⊤s) = heap × word ∪ {error}
γ(v♯) =
{
h, v | h ⊢ h ∧ v ∈ γh(v
♯)
}
.
Partial order, least upper bound and transfer function The partial orders
⊑v ⊆ value
♯ × value♯ and ⊑ ⊆ state♯
⊤s
⊥s
× state♯
⊤s
⊥s
are defined by the following
rules:
null ⊑v v
♯ v♯ ⊑v ⊤v
∀j ≤ n′ ∃i ≤ n ti  t
′
j
t1 ∧ · · · ∧ tn ⊑v t
′
1 ∧ · · · ∧ t
′
n′
⊥s ⊑ s
♯ s♯ ⊑ ⊤s
∀x ∈ var l ♯(x) ⊑ l ′♯(x)
l ♯ ⊑ l ′♯
The (commutative) least upper bound operators ⊔v : value
♯ × value♯ → value♯
and ⊔ : state♯
⊤s
⊥s
× state♯
⊤s
⊥s
→ state♯
⊤s
⊥s
are defined by
null ⊔v v
♯ = v♯
v♯ ⊔v ⊤v = ⊤v
t1 ∧ · · · ∧ tn
⊔v t
′
1 ∧ · · · ∧ t
′
n′
=
{
let T = {t ∈ type | ∃i ≤ n, j ≤ n′ ti  t ∧ t
′
j  t}
in
∧
{t ∈ T | ∀t ′ ∈ T t ′  t =⇒ t ′ = t}
⊥s ⊔ s
♯ = s♯
s♯ ⊔ ⊤s = ⊤s
l ♯ ⊔ l ′♯ = λx.l ♯(x) ⊔v l
′♯(x).
The least upper bound of two (non-empty) conjunctions is always defined (and
non-empty), because Object is a super type of all reference types (including
interfaces and array types). The second line in the least upper bounds of two
conjunctions ensures that we keep only maximal atoms. The actual computation
of the least upper bound of two conjunctions can be performed efficiently: as
only minimal types t ∈ T will be kept, it is sufficient to find the first super-
class and/or super-interfaces of each pair ti, t
′
j , which is done by traversing the
hierarchy above ti and t
′
j . Figure 3 defines the abstract semantics as two relations:
−→ ⊆ ppoint × (state♯ → state♯
⊤s
⊥s
)× ppoint
−→ ⊆ ppoint × (state♯ → value♯)
3.2 Correctness of the abstraction
Lemma 1 ensures the consistency of the partial order with respect to the con-
cretisation, which is crucial for the correctness of the verification.
Lemma 1. For all h ∈ heap and v♯, v′♯ ∈ value♯, if v♯ ⊑v v
′♯ then γh(v
♯) ⊆
γh(v
′♯). For all p ∈ ppoint and s♯, s′♯ ∈ state♯
⊤s
⊥s
, if s♯ ⊑ s′♯ then γp(s
♯) ⊆
γp(s
′♯). For all v♯, v′
♯ ∈ value♯ ∪ {⊤s}, if v
′♯ = ⊤s ∨ v
♯ ⊑v v
′♯ then γ(v♯) ⊆
γ(v′
♯
).
The least upper bound operator is used during the fix-point computation and
must be correct for the analyser to be correct (but not for the checker).
Lemma 2. For all v♯, v′
♯ ∈ value♯, v♯ ⊔v v
′♯ ⊒v v
♯ and v♯ ⊔v v
′♯ ⊒v v
′♯. For
all s♯, s′
♯ ∈ state♯
⊤s
⊥s
, s♯ ⊔ s′♯ ⊒ s♯ and s♯ ⊔ s′♯ ⊒ s′♯.
The core of the correctness of the checker (and of the analyser) resides in
Lemma 3 which says that the concrete transition relation is correctly approxi-
mated.
Lemma 3. Suppose that for every signature ms the relation
ms
−→ is safe with
respect to ms (see Definition 1). Let s ∈ state, r ∈ state∪(heap×word)∪{error},
p ∈ ppoint and l ♯ ∈ state♯ such that s → r and s ∈ γp(l
♯). Then one of the
following holds:
JnK♯
l♯
= ⊤v
JnullK♯
l♯
= null
Jy + zK♯
l♯
= ⊤v
Jnew CK♯
l♯
= C
Jnew t [y]K♯
l♯
= t []
Jy.fsK♯
l♯
=

t if fs = C.f : t ∧ l ♯(y) ⊑v C
⊤s otherwise
Jy[z]K♯
l♯
=
8
<
:
t if l ♯(y) = t [] t ∈ type
⊥s if l
♯(y) = null
⊤s if l
♯(y) 6∈ {null} ∪ {t [] | t ∈ type}
Jy.ms(x1, . . . , xn)K
♯
l♯
=
8
>
<
>
:
result(ms)
if ms = t .m(t1, . . . , tn)
∧ l ♯(y) ⊑v t ∧ ∀i ≤ n l
♯(xi) ⊑v ti
⊤s otherwise
(a) Abstract semantics JeK♯
l♯
∈ value♯ ∪ {⊥s,⊤s} of an expression e in the abstract
context l ♯
Jx := eK♯(l ♯) =
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
l ♯[x← JeK♯
l♯
]
if JeK♯
l♯
6∈ {⊥s,⊤s}
⊥s if JeK
♯
l♯
= ⊥s
⊤s if JeK
♯
l♯
= ⊤s
Jx.fs := yK♯(l ♯) =
8
<
:
l ♯ if fs = C.f : t
∧ l ♯(x) ⊑v C ∧ l
♯(y) ⊑v t
⊤s otherwise
Jx[y] := zK♯(l ♯) =
8
<
:
l ♯ if l ♯(x) = t [] t ∈ type
⊥s if l
♯(x) = null
⊤s if l
♯(y) 6∈ {null} ∪ {t [] | t ∈ type}
(b) Abstract semantics JiK♯ : state♯ → state♯
⊤s
⊥s
of a non-branching instruction i
(i 6= return x)
code(p) 6∈ {return x, goto p′, if · · · }
p
Jcode(p)K♯
−→ p + 1
code(p) = goto p′
p
λl♯.l♯
−→ p′
code(p) = if x < y p′
p
λl♯.l♯
−→ p′
code(p) = if x < y p′
p
λl♯.l♯
−→ p + 1
code(p) = return x
p
λl♯.l♯(x)
−→
(c) Abstract transition relations −→ ⊆ ppoint × (state♯ → state♯
⊤s
⊥s
) × ppoint and
−→ ⊆ ppoint × (state♯ → value♯)
Fig. 3: Abstract semantics of Java bytecode
1. p
F ♯
−→ p′ and r ∈ γp′(F
♯(l ♯)) for some p′ and F ♯, or
2. p
F ♯
−→ and r ∈ γ(F ♯(l ♯)) for some F ♯.
Furthermore, the functions F ♯ are monotone.
Formal proofs can be found in the technical report [2].
3.3 Analysis and checking
The following definition introduce the notion of witness of the current method
whose signature is given by targ and tret.
Definition 3. A witness is a stack map m ∈ map such that
1. ∀x ∈ var m(0)(x) ⊒v
{
targ(x) if x ∈ arg
⊤v otherwise
2. ∀p, p′ ∈ ppoint p
F ♯
−→ p′ =⇒ F ♯(m(p)) ⊑ m(p′)
3. ∀p ∈ ppoint p
F ♯
−→ =⇒ F ♯(m(p)) ⊑v tret
Note that by definition of stack maps, witnesses contain no ⊤s or ⊥s. This
correspond respectively to the assumptions that the code should type without
error, and that even dead code should be typable. This second condition is
necessary for the pruning to work.
The following lemma shows that the memory safety property can be ensured
by simply checking that some given stack map is a witness, and shows how to
compute the least witness. The next section will show that, for Java programs,
the least witness can be pruned resulting in a witness without conjunction.
Theorem 1. Suppose that every relation
ms
−→ is safe with respect to ms (see
Definition 1). If there exists a witness m then the relation → is safe with respect
to targ and tret. Moreover, the least witness
6 (if there exists a witness) can be
computed by fixpoint iteration.
The proof can be found in the technical report [2].
4 Lightweight verification by fix-point pruning
In the previous section we formalised a bytecode analysis extended to inter-
faces, using conjunctions of types in the abstract domain. The drawback of this
extension is its computational cost, especially in terms of memory, that could
make it unapplicable on the smallest Java capable devices. We will now present
an additional step to the lightweight verification setting that removes the need
for computations of sets of types on the consumer side by computing a witness
without conjunction, if the safety of the program does not rely on them. This is
the case for programs compiled from Java in particular.
6 The abstract state ⊥s is not a witness by definition, but the state λx ∈ var .null is a
minimum of state♯. Thus, if the set of witnesses is not empty, it has a least element.
public static void main(String [] args) {
I3 ∧ I4 i = args.length > 0 ? new A() : new B();
i.m3();
i.m4();
}
Fig. 4: A safe Java bytecode program that has no conjunction-free witness
4.1 Stack map checking without conjunctions
We first present an algorithm, which when possible, computes a conjunction-
free witness from the least fix-point. The key hypothesis of this algorithm is
therefore the existence of a witness without conjunction. This is not the case of
all bytecode programs. Figure 4 shows a method that has no such witness (I3,
I4, A and B are defined as in Section 1). It is shown in pseudo Java (with a
conjunction of types) but has to be written directly in bytecode.
As explained in the previous section, the checking of bytecode mainly consist
in the verification of the conditions of Definition 3, which reduces to compu-
tations of the functions F ♯ of the abstract semantics, and ordering checks ⊑
between abstract states. As the F ♯s never “create” a conjunction of types (this
is easily verified on the definition), we can see that the checking of a conjunction-
free witness can be performed without manipulating conjunctions7. So the tech-
nique of pruning removes the need for conjunction computations.
Fix-point pruning The algorithm of Figure 5 optimistically searches for such
a witness. It starts from the least witness (if it exists)
lfp ∈ map
computed by direct analysis, and traverses the set of conjunction-free stack maps
that are greater than lfp, until a witness is reached or the search space is ex-
hausted. If there exists a witness without conjunction, it must belong to this set,
by definition of the least fix-point. Moreover, the finite ascending chain condition
satisfied by the lattice ensures that the search space is finite so the exploration
terminates (which is interesting in case there is no such witness). Therefore this
algorithm is complete in the sense that if a solution exists, it will find it.
More precisely, the idea is to start from ⊤v at each program point and each
variable and replace those values by lesser ones until a witness is reached. The
non-deterministic instruction “choose” is to be interpreted as follows: if the
choice fails at any point (i.e., there is no v♯ satisfying the required conditions)
then we backtrack to a previous choice. The algorithm can terminate either by
returning a witness, or by returning nothing, if every combination of choices
7 In the real process, the value of the witness is only sent for some program points and
the remaining values are reconstructed at checking time, but no least upper bound
is involved, thus the property still holds.
let w = λp ∈ ppoint .λx ∈ var .⊤v and W = ppoint
while W 6= ∅ do
take p ∈W (and remove it)
choose a maximal l ♯ ∈ state♯ such that
l ♯ is without conjunction and lfp(p) ⊑ l ♯ ⊑ w(p)
and ∀p′ ∈ ppoint p
F ♯
→ p′ =⇒
F ♯(l ♯) 6= ⊤s
∧ F ♯(l ♯) ⊑ w(p′)
∧ p
F ♯
→ =⇒ F ♯(l ♯) ⊑v tret
if l ♯ 6= w(p) then
w := w[p← l ♯]
W := W ∪ {p′ | p′
F ♯
→ p}
end if
done
return w
Fig. 5: Naive (complete) pruning algorithm
eventually gets stuck. As for the strategy used to implement the work-set (in-
struction “take”), we found that a stack without duplicates was an efficient and
simple heuristic. Note that this second sort of choice is never undone and does
not cause further backtracking.
The following theorem formalizes the fact that the algorithm of Figure 5 is
sound and complete (when a witness without conjunction exists).
Theorem 2. The complete pruning algorithm always terminates, either by re-
turning a stack map w or by a failure in the choice of l ♯. If it terminates
by returning some w, then w is a conjunction-free witness. Furthermore, if a
conjunction-free witness w exists, the algorithm will return such a witness.
The proof can be found in the technical report [2].
Java programs In the Java language, all variables are declared with a fixed
type t ∈ type (actually, the basic types are not exactly the same between Java
and bytecode: the smaller integer types are merged with int in the latter). This
type satisfies the same constraints that are expressed by the abstract semantics
in the previous section (including the ones for interfaces) and can therefore be
considered as a witness for each method, where the type of every variable is the
same regardless of the program point. The difference is that the variables are
the source variables, not the bytecode local variables and stack positions.
If the compiler does not transform the structure of the program too much,
more precisely if each variable of the source program is mapped to a (bytecode)
local variable in a given subset of the (bytecode) program points, without over-
lapping, then we see that the witness representing the typing of the source code
can be renamed to a corresponding witness on the bytecode. This witness has an
public static void main(String [] args) {
I3 i3 = args.length > 0 ? new A() : new B();
I4 i4 = args.length > 0 ? new A() : new B();
i3.m3();
i4.m4();
Object i = args.length > 0 ? i3 : i4;
i.toString();
}
Fig. 6: A Java program for which a conjunction-free witness cannot be build from the
atomic types of the least fix-point.
interesting feature: it does not contain any conjunction (because variables are
declared with a single type). Therefore, for bytecode compiled from Java with
a “natural” compiler, there exists a conjunction-free witness for every method
(and thus the algorithm of the previous section will find it).
An alternative solution for introducing the verification of interfaces in a
lightweight verification process in the case of Java (source) programs is to gen-
erate a stack map from the type annotations present in the source code. Indeed,
as the lightweight verification paradigm is being generalized to J2SE Java [9],
the task of generating stack maps is moving from a dedicated “preverifier” pro-
gram to the compiler itself. One disadvantage of this technique is that all the
tools that manipulate bytecode (notably the compiler) must take care of stack
maps consistently, which complicates their design. Instead, we extract a witness
without conjunction directly from the bytecode (given that there exists one).
4.2 Efficient fix-point pruning
Although the first algorithm is complete, it takes potentially a very long time,
since the search space is the product over program points and local variables
of the part of the type hierarchy that is greater than the corresponding value
type in the least fix-point. In fact, it is rarely necessary, for a given variable and
program point, to consider the entire type hierarchy above the type given by
the least fix-point. Most of the time it is enough to choose one of its conjuncts
(if it is a conjunction). The resulting pruning algorithm still has an exponential
complexity, but it performs reasonably fast in practice.
Reducing the branching factor In most cases, the following holds: there
exists a witness w ∈ map without conjunction such that the atomic types that
appear in w are atoms of the corresponding conjunctions in the least fix point.
∀p ∈ ppoint ∀x ∈ var w(p)(x) = t ∈ type =⇒ lfp(p)(x) = t ∧ · · ·
This is not true for the program in Figure 6 (I3, I4, A and B are defined as in
Section 1). In this example, we build two variables i3 and i4 with most precise
type I3 ∧ I4. The variable i is then defined as the “union” of the two, and its
type is therefore I3 ∧ I4. However, in a stack map without conjunction, the
type of i3 must be I3, and the type of i4 must be I4 (because we call m3
and m4, respectively). Therefore, the type of i must be greater than the least
upper bound of I3 and I4, i.e., java.lang.Object, which is not an atom of
I3 ∧ I4. Nevertheless, this seems to be a pathological example and in practise
the above hypothesis holds for all our (substantial) benchmarks, which indicates
that it’s applicability is very general.
Algorithm Taking into account the hypothesis of section 4.2, we proceed by
searching for a witness satisfying this hypothesis. The optimized algorithm is
obtained by replacing the condition
l ♯ is without conjunction and lfp ⊑ l ♯
by the stronger condition
∀x ∈ var l ♯(x) = ⊤
∨ l ♯(x) = t ∈ type ∧ lfp(p)(x) = t ∧ · · ·
∨ l ♯(x) = null = lfp(p)(x)
in the algorithm of Figure 5.
Correctness As the complete version, the new algorithm is sound and terminates
and, though it is incomplete (see the above counter-example), it will succeed in
finding a witness if the optimistic hypothesis holds. If not, the search will fail
and the complete algorithm presented before should then be run instead.
5 Experiments
We have implemented our ideas in a verifier for real Java bytecode that adds the
stack maps as method attributes, as defined in the JVM specification.
5.1 Extensions and limitations
The bytecode language presented so far is considerably simplified. We had to
address a few more issues to deal with real bytecode. First, the Java bytecode
uses an operand stack in addition to local variables. This complicates the abstract
states, as they now have another list of abstract values, of variable length. Of
course, this adds more reasons for the verification to fail, namely, (operand)
stack overflow or underflow, or the possibility to have different stack heights
at some program point. Second, in addition to 32-bit integers, Java bytecode
has floats, longs and doubles. floats are easily abstracted by ⊤v, and the 64-bit
types by two ⊤vs. Note that, although 32-bit integers are not distinguished from
shorter integers at the bytecode level (they are in the source code), this is not the
case for arrays of such types. Therefore, to ensure that the array bounds checks
performed at runtime correctly interpret the length field, the size of elements
must be known. This implies that arrays of floats or ints must not be confused
with arrays of shorts. However, individual float and int values can still be merged,
since the instruction for accessing arrays are typed. The last additional feature is
throwing and catching exceptions. From the verification point of view, exceptions
just add some more transitions in the control flow graph, with a semantics that
empties the stack and then push some constant reference type (the type that is
caught by the corresponding handler). They pose no particular difficulty.
While analysing real bytecode, we have omitted some aspects of the verifica-
tion in the concrete implementation. In particular, we do not address the issue of
verifying sub-routines. Also, a byte code verifier should verify that any object is
initialized before being used. The benchmarks presented here do not include this
phase. Finally, note that the semantics that we gave to the bytecode used big-
step calls, which prevents us to consider even a simplified (interleaving) version
of concurrency, which would require explicit call stacks. Therefore, in principle,
all the results presented here only applies to single-threaded programs. However,
the scheme of the proof (an invariant that holds at each state of a small-step
semantics) does not seem to rely on sequentiality, and we believe that there is
no issue in extending it to threads.
5.2 Stack maps and checking
The stack maps that are attached to the bytecode are not exactly a represen-
tation of conjunction-free witnesses, but only of the value of such witnesses for
a subset of the program points. These points correspond basically to the ba-
sic blocks of the control flow graph. This reduces the size of stack maps, while
still allowing a very simple checking algorithm that evaluates program points in
order. We will not detail this aspect, as we used the same subset of program
points and the same checking algorithm as Sun’s lightweight bytecode verifier.
The resulting stack maps are encoded in the class files either as StackMap at-
tributes in the same format as the lightweight bytecode verifier, or with a new
attribute using a sparse representation. In the latter, we just replaced an array
of value types by an array of bits (to indicate which values are not ⊤v) followed
by the list of non-⊤v values. In order for the comparison to be fair, the sparse
representation uses the same verbose encoding of value types as the stack map
representation.
5.3 Results
Three test suites were used to experiment with the analysis, pruning and checking
with interfaces. The first one consists of 433 old midlets (Java applets for mobile
phones) downloaded from midlet.org. The second one is Soot 2.2.4, a framework
for analysing Java bytecode. The last test case is Eclipse SDK 3.2.2
All methods have been successfully analysed, pruned and checked except
those that contained sub-routines, referred to unavailable libraries, contained
dead code (because the pruning algorithm does not apply if the least fix-points
is ⊥s for some program points) or referred to classes that existed in different
versions in the same program. This last case happens in Eclipse and we built
conservatively the complete hierarchy of the distributed classes, by taking the
union8. In all cases, a stack map without conjunction could be obtained from
the atoms of the least fix-point, thanks to the heuristic presented in Section 4.2.
The first table shows the main interesting computing times for the three case
jar size analysis + pruning analysis pruning checking
midlets 11M 5m54 23% 77% 0m23
Soot 4.4M 3m40 17% 83% 0m11
Eclipse 96M 24m43 26% 74% 1m55
studies. The first column gives the size of the benchmarks (jar files). The second
one shows the total time taken by the complete stack map generation procedure
(on the producer’s side). This time is then divided into the analysis phase (third
column) and the pruning phase (fourth column). The last column correspond
to the checking time (consumer’s side). Clearly, most of the time is spent in
pruning, but even this time remains acceptable (three to six times the cost of
the analysis), especially since this operation only needs to be performed once,
by the code producer. The checking time is short and could be further reduced
with a reasonably optimised implementation.
The second table estimates the size of witnesses before and after pruning,
proportion of non-⊤v in lfp pruned stack map ratio
midlets 44% 34% 77%
Soot 67% 42% 63%
Eclipse 58% 39% 66%
in terms of the proportion of pairs p, x for which the value is not ⊤v. The last
column shows the proportion of “positions” (of pairs p, x) that are kept with
a non-⊤v value by pruning. We see that the “initial” proportion of non-⊤v is
greater in Soot and Eclipse, which indicates that objects (or arrays) are used
more often in Eclipse than in midlets (remember that base types are abstracted
by ⊤v). Also, the pruning removes more values in Soot and Eclipse than in
midlets (which is not surprising since there are more non-⊤v values to remove,
in proportion). In the end, the numbers of non-⊤v in the stack maps are very
close for the three test cases.
The first four sub-columns of the last table give the space saved by pruning,
both for the class files and the jar files (compressed archives). The numbers
correspond to the difference in size with respect to the same file format without
stack map. For example, the total jar size for Eclipse with pruned stack maps
included is 3.0% greater than the original jar files (without stack maps). In
the two columns for the fix-point, since only conjunction-free witnesses can be
encoded in class files, we did not include any stack map for the methods whose
8 Some classes even exist with different super-classes. In this case we just choose one,
which is definitely not safe.
witness fix-point pruned witness
representation extensive extensive sparse
format .class .jar .class .jar .class .jar
midlets 19.8% 7.3% 17.4% 6.8% 16.0% 7.0%
Soot 14.0% 7.2% 11.5% 6.5% 11.5% 7.3%
Eclipse 11.8% 3.3% 9.5% 3.0% 9.6% 3.2%
least fix-point had conjunctions (which is actually quite rare). Note that we can
only underestimate the benefit of pruning by doing this. In the case of midlets,
for example, the size of the stack maps is reduced from 19.8% to 17.4% of the
total initial class files, or from 7.3% to 6.8% of the initial jar files. Therefore
there is no significant improvement here since the size of what is shipped (i.e.,
the jar files with stack maps) is only reduced by less that one percent.
The last two sub-columns of the figure show the effect of a sparse representa-
tion of the stack maps obtained after pruning. We see that a sparse representation
has little impact on the size, and that the small savings that we get for (some)
class files are canceled by the compression phase, and tend to yeld larger jar files
(even if the eight-byte alignment of the class files is kept).
We have not tried to encode our stack maps with the new StackMapTable
attribute defined by JSR202, which was designed to factorize most of the infor-
mation. The results would probably be quite different since this format relies
on the assumption that the type of variables do not change too often, while the
pruning may for example set any variable to ⊤v even if it was not modified, as
soon as the type information for this variable is not needed anymore.
6 Related work
The formalisation of Java byte code verification has received a lot of attention.
Freund and Mitchell [7] prove the soundness of a type system for a very large
subset of the Java bytecode with respect to a small-step operational semantics
(with explicit stacks). Their model of states is close to ours, but instrumented
by tags that keep track of the type of every value. They do not address the
problem of inferring types in presence of interfaces. A survey of bytecode verifi-
cation techniques and solutions to various known difficulties (interfaces, object
initialisation, sub-routines) can be found in [11].
The concept of lightweight verification, which is now used in J2ME, was
introduced by Rose [16]. Several algorithms were given, with enhancements that
allow to reduce the number of program points for which a stack map is necessary,
more than what is done in Sun’s lightweight bytecode verifier. The issue of
verifying interfaces was not considered.
Using sets of types to verify interfaces has been explored by Knoblock and
Rehof [10] who analyse an SSA form of the Java bytecode in the Dedekind-
MacNeille completion of the type hierarchy. They show that this minimal com-
pletion achieves an optimal precision, i.e., every program typable in the power
set completion is typable in the Dedekind-MacNeille completion. The analysis
presented in section 3 is therefore very similar to their work. Our representa-
tion of the domain differs, though: we use conjunctions of types rather that
disjunctions (in both cases, upward/downward-closed sets are not represented
in extension). The lattice that we use to abstract values is close to the ideal
completion of the type hierarchy (it is a super-set of the ideal completion be-
cause the latter further requires that conjunctions be “not empty”, in the sense
that they must have a lower bound in the hierarchy). Furthermore, our analysis
only uses the subset of value♯ that is obtained by taking upper bounds of atomic
types, which is isomorphic to the Dedekind-MacNeille completion of type \{int}.
See [6] for an account on completion techniques for posets. Knoblock and Rehof
do not prove the correctness of their analysis with respect to a concrete seman-
tics and safety property. Qian [15] proposes a type system for Java bytecode
that uses arbitrary disjunctions of reference types to allow the static verification
of interfaces. Several safety properties are proved for typable programs (type
preservation, possible uses of uninitialized objects, of sub-routines return ad-
dresses). The actual inference of types is not detailed. Push [14] has formalised
a variant of Qian’s bytecode verifier in HOL and proved its correctness with
respect to a small-step operational semantics. Again, concrete values are tagged
with their type. Goldberg [8] focuses on dynamic loading of classes and proposes
a framework for verifying Java class files out of order, while ensuring the global
soundness of typing. Class files are verified by a data-flow analysis that uses dis-
junctions of types (which solves the problem of not knowing the type hierarchy)
and yields the minimal set of ordering constraints between types under which
the class is type-safe. These constraints are added to a global typing context that
is transmitted across invocations of the verifier, and the global safety is defined
as the consistency of this context.
We have previously proposed a pruning algorithm for getting weaker abstract
interpretation witnesses [3]. Such pruning algorithms were independently studied
by Seo, Yang, Yi and Han [17]. The problem that we consider here is different:
the goal is not to get a maximal witness in a given lattice, but to get a witness
without conjunction, a property that is not monotone. Therefore, directly ap-
plying one of the algorithms from [3] would not necessarily help in getting such a
witness. The backward computation that we proposed in the same work for dis-
tributive analyses (which is the case of the bytecode verification) does not apply
either, as shown in the introduction: the backward algorithm performs greatest
lower bound operations, which in the present setting introduce conjunctions.
7 Conclusion
We have shown how the notion of pruning provides a viable means of integrat-
ing the verification of interfaces into lightweight bytecode verification. This is
achieved by combining an extended bytecode analyser and an algorithm for re-
moving conjunctions from the result of the analysis which, together, allows to
compute stack maps where interfaces are treated on a par with other types.
The bytecode analysis that we have proposed here adds sets of types to the
abstract domain in order to verify interfaces. The ensuing pruning step optimises
the typing found by the analyser, reducing all such sets to a singleton, and
removing as many typing information as possible while still ensuring the memory
safety, i.e., that all memory accesses will be to existing fields of objects. The
resulting stack maps can be checked without any overhead compared to existing
lightweight bytecode verification and will ensure statically the safety of interface
method calls. We also show that it is possible to simplify several aspects of the
BCV when constructing an abstract domain that is specific to the memory safety
property. In particular, there is no need to distinguish between base types and
it is even possible to identify these base type with the ⊤v element of the domain
(which allows a program to use an address as an integer).
In terms of semantic correctness, we have shown that it is possible to reason
directly with an untyped concrete semantics rather than a defensive virtual ma-
chine. Both techniques are equally sound, but the latter requires an additional
abstraction step that explains the link between the raw state model that we use
and the tagged memory objects used in the instrumented semantics. In other
words, we use a notion of state that is closer to the actual implementation and,
hence, more convincing. In order to complete the picture, the semantics with
big-step calls that we used should be related to a small-step semantics with a
call stack, but we leave this for further work.
In terms of experiments, we have shown that the technique works well in
practice, as we could successfully analyse a large set of Java class files. Further-
more, the idea is not relevant just for Java, but should apply to other object
oriented languages with multiple inheritance, since it only relies on the trans-
formation of the poset representing a type hierarchy into a lattice. The results
show that it is feasible to compute efficiently conjunction-free stack maps with
interfaces ; however, they are disappointing in terms of reducing the stack map
size: even though a significant number of variables are set to ⊤v by pruning,
this is not enough for a sparse coding to be more efficient than a naive coding
of stack maps, especially as class files are eventually compressed.
As we said before, in this study we considered one aspect of the security of
Java bytecode, viz., the memory safety. Further work should extend the formali-
sation proposed here to prove that for example access control properties are also
ensured by the verifier. In another direction, our stack map generator should be
extended to produce stack maps in the StacMapTable format proposed for Java.
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